



NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Report #42
Semiannual Report to Congress



April 1, 2010 –
September 30, 2010

VISION

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) strives to provide Amtrak's employees, its customers, the public, and the Congress with the highest quality service and programs through vigilance, timely action, accuracy, and an overall commitment to excellence across the broad range of OIG responsibilities.


MISSION

The OIG conducts and supervises independent and objective audits, inspections, evaluations, and investigations relating to Amtrak programs and operations; promotes economy, effectiveness, and efficiency within the company; prevents and detects fraud, waste, and abuse in company programs and operations; reviews security and safety policies and programs, and reviews and makes recommendations regarding existing and proposed legislation and regulations relating to Amtrak's programs and operations.



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Washington, DC



National Railroad Passenger Corporation
Office of Inspector General

I am pleased to present the Amtrak Office of Inspector General (OIG) Semiannual Report to Congress for the six months ending September 30, 2010. In addition to describing significant OIG accomplishments during this period, this report highlights ongoing actions to strengthen OIG operations and make progress toward our goal of becoming a model OIG.

The Amtrak OIG is uniquely situated to oversee Amtrak operations. Our staff combines personnel with many years of experience in the railroad industry with those steeped in a background of auditing and investigative work according to professional standards. Together, this has resulted in a team that can knowledgeably assess Amtrak operations and offer recommendations for improvement, based not only on a thorough understanding of the company but also on experience with countless similar entities.

We continue to build our capacity to conduct effective independent oversight and to improve relationships among OIG, AMTRAK management, Congress, and other stakeholders. We likewise continue to enhance both the quality and quantity of our audits, evaluations, and investigations: at least eight major audits are in progress that focus on information technology, financial reporting, procurement, vendor payments, projects funded by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), and projects associated with the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Significant Accomplishments

As stewards of public funds, the OIG seeks to ensure that monies spent are spent wisely, with appropriate value received. During this reporting period, our audit and evaluation units produced testimony before Congress and issued three reports that identified \$1.3 million in financial benefits. Our investigative

work resulted in securing convictions and court-ordered fines and restitution in theft schemes involving health care and credit card fraud, totaling over \$800,000. We also secured over \$65,000 in administrative recoveries for the company.

We continued to identify opportunities to reduce costs, improve management operations, and institute more efficient and effective business processes. For example:

- In April 2010, I testified before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies, to discuss Amtrak's Fiscal Year 2011 budget request. My testimony focused on opportunities Amtrak has to provide increased levels of high-quality passenger rail services, as well as important challenges it must address to take advantage of these opportunities. The 2008 Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act included several provisions aimed at encouraging Amtrak to operate more efficiently and provided flexibility to the states in determining who will plan, develop, and operate new services. While Amtrak has many advantages that should help it prosper in a new, competitive environment, it faces four inter-related management challenges:
 1. Successfully competing for new, state-supported corridor and high-speed rail services and then delivering high-quality, cost-effective service.
 2. Improving human capital management practices, including strategic workforce planning, along with training and development.
 3. Managing risks associated with the modernization of Amtrak's information technology systems and infrastructure.
 4. Managing risks associated with projects funded through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA).
- Our May 2010 audit of project risks associated with nine key engineering projects funded by ARRA and valued at \$277 million identified risk areas across projects. The report identified several risks, and determined that Amtrak management was taking steps to mitigate them.

However, Amtrak managers and executives were not in a position to mitigate the most significant risk, the grant requirement that Amtrak take "extraordinary measures" to ensure that projects would be completed by the February 2011 ARRA deadline. This requirement may have the

unintended consequence of encouraging Amtrak to take actions that increase the risk of waste and inefficiency or even to take shortcuts that could increase the risk that the project will not perform as well as expected and will not provide the benefits expected.

Because the grant agreement, rather than law, is driving these extraordinary measures, we recommended that Amtrak apply to the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to amend the grant provisions. These provisions should ensure a balance between spending taxpayer funds in a timely manner and achieving project objectives—without actions that could increase the potential for waste or inefficiency.

We further recommended that Amtrak apply to FRA for a grant waiver in instances in which reasonable measures have failed to bring the project within the grant deadline. Management agreed with the report's findings and concurred with all of our recommendations. In August the grant agreement waiver provision was amended. Amtrak must now identify the measures it has undertaken to complete the project by the February 17, 2011, date, and is not required to take extraordinary measures.

- Our July 2010 evaluation of Amtrak's strategic planning found that while the establishment of an executive leadership team to "create the future service and organizational vision for the company" is a significant move forward, it does not incorporate the key elements of a strategic planning process and does not explicitly call for the development of a strategic plan. Developing a strategic plan could assist Amtrak's leadership in effectively aligning organizational efforts around a single vision and ensuring the effective use of resources.

We recommended that Amtrak develop a strategic plan utilizing a strategic planning process that incorporates the key elements of effective strategic planning. Amtrak management agreed, and committed to preparing a timeline for the development of a strategic plan by October 19, 2010.

- Our September 2010 audit of the monthly on-time performance bills and schedules for our 7-month audit period disclosed that Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF) inaccurately billed Amtrak, resulting in over \$1 million in questioned costs. This resulted from BNSF's not complying with provisions of the operating agreement and routinely submitting inaccurate billings. We also found that Amtrak did not perform a complete, through review to verify the on-time performance incentives billed by

BNSF prior to approving them for payment. Finally, management authorized relief requests and paid BNSF almost \$240,000 for on-time performance claims that were not covered by the operating agreement. These funds could have been put to better use by Amtrak to help meet its goals and reduce operating expenses and federal subsidies.

We recommended that Amtrak recover the \$1,055,662 from BNSF and develop and implement a criterion-based process for consistently reviewing and approving relief requests. Amtrak agreed with our findings and recommendations and provided an action plan with milestone dates.

Significant Actions Taken to Strengthen OIG Operations

A critical element for ensuring that the OIG can effectively perform the independent role mandated by the Inspector General Act of 1978 is a professional and effective working relationship between the OIG and Amtrak management. Amtrak management and the OIG made significant progress in overcoming these relationship issues by developing a new relationship policy that fully meets the letter and spirit of the IG Act, withdrawing the OIG from performing management functions, and rebuilding relationships among Amtrak and OIG managers and staff.

Further, during this reporting period, the OIG has either completed or initiated several actions to strengthen our operations and ensure that we operate efficiently and effectively.


First, I selected David Warren as the Assistant Inspector General for Audits. Mr. Warren spent 30 years with the Government Accountability Office and has extensive experience in leading performance and financial audits. Most recently he served as the Assistant Inspector General for Audits with the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

Second, to help us advance our strategic goal of becoming a model OIG, we engaged the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to conduct an organizational assessment of the Amtrak OIG. NAPA issued its report in August 2010 and made 41 recommendations that focused on eight areas in which we can enhance our operations.

We are currently developing an implementation plan to address NAPA's recommendations in each of these areas. We have engaged NAPA to assist us in the process of developing implementation plans for the four areas with the highest levels of priority and urgency—internal communication, work planning and prioritization, quality and timely work processes, and performance measures.

Third, it is the policy of the Amtrak OIG that our audit work will comply with the 2007 revision of generally accepted government auditing standards. To that end, we have developed a comprehensive audit and evaluation manual. We are currently providing our auditors and evaluators with three days of familiarization training on these new policies and procedures.

I look forward to working with the Chairman, Board members, President, and executives at Amtrak, and the House and Senate authorization, oversight, and appropriations committees in the months ahead to meet the challenges facing Amtrak and the OIG.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Ted' followed by a stylized, wavy line.

Theodore (Ted) Alves
Inspector General



Union Station, Washington, DC

Photo: Max Hirschfeld/MaxPix

OIG Profile

Vision, Mission, and Authority

Vision

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) strives to provide Amtrak's employees, its customers, the public, and the Congress with the highest quality service and programs through vigilance, timely action, accuracy, and an overall commitment to excellence across the broad range of OIG responsibilities.

Mission

The OIG will conduct and supervise independent and objective audits, inspections, evaluations, and investigations relating to Amtrak's programs and operations; promote economy, effectiveness, and efficiency within Amtrak; prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse in Amtrak's programs and operations; review security and safety policies and programs; and review and make recommendations regarding existing and proposed legislation and regulations relating to Amtrak's programs and operations.

Authority

The Inspector General Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-452, 5 U.S.C. Appendix 3), as amended in 1988 (P.L. 100-504), established the Office of Inspector General for Amtrak to consolidate existing investigative and audit resources into independent organizations headed by an Inspector General (IG) to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness; and detect and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse. Subsequently, the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008 (P. L. 110-409) amended and strengthened the authority of the Offices of Inspectors General.

Guiding Principles and Values


OIG principles and values are important because they form the building blocks used to accomplish its mission and conduct its day-to-day operations:



Amtrak’s Office of Inspector General will:

- **High Quality, Relevance, Timeliness**—Provide valuable and timely service. Work products are high quality, relevant, timely, add value, and are responsive to the needs of Amtrak, and its stakeholders.
- **Independence and Objectivity**—Be committed to carrying out its mission with objectivity and independence, both in appearance and fact. Conflicts, improper influence, or other impediments do not interfere with our work.
- **Customer Service**—Strive to be aware of the needs of stakeholders and work with Amtrak’s chairman, the Board of Directors, and the Congress to improve program management.
- **Innovation**—Be innovative, question existing procedures, and suggest improvements. New ideas and creativity are fundamental to continued growth, development, and problem solving.
- **Respecting and Developing People**—Create an environment that supports gathering, sharing, and retaining knowledge; fosters treating everyone fairly and with mutual respect through words and actions; ensures professional growth; and values the diverse backgrounds, skills, and perspectives of employees.
- **Professionalism**—Be committed to our professional standards and foster relationships with stakeholders that rely on communication and cooperation. Relationships with program managers are based on a shared commitment to improving program operations and effectiveness.

Office of Inspector General Organization



The OIG headquarters is based in Washington, D.C., with seven field offices located in Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, and Wilmington, Delaware.

The Inspector General provides policy direction and leadership for Amtrak’s Office of Inspector General and serves as an independent voice to the Board of Directors and Congress by identifying opportunities and promoting solutions for improving the company’s performance. The Deputy Inspector General assists the Inspector General in development and implementation of the OIG’s diverse audit, investigative, legal, and support operations.

Audits

The Office of Audits conducts independent and objective audits and reviews of Amtrak's programs and recommends improvements to better safeguard its assets and to improve programs and operations, including contractor activities.

Inspections and Evaluations

The Office of Inspections and Evaluations conducts evaluations of Amtrak programs and operations to identify opportunities to improve cost efficiency and effectiveness, and the overall quality of service delivery throughout Amtrak.

Investigations

The Office of Investigations investigates allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, and misconduct that could affect Amtrak's programs, operations, assets, and other resources. Investigative findings are referred to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution or civil litigation, or to Amtrak management for administrative action. The office develops recommendations to reduce Amtrak's vulnerability to criminal activity.

General Counsel

The General Counsel is responsible for providing legal assistance and advice to OIG senior management and supports audits, evaluations, special reviews, and investigations. Counsel coordinates with outside attorneys, including local and



Empire Builder at Columbia River Gorge, Oregon



Empire Builder at Glacier National Park, Montana

federal agencies and law enforcement attorneys, and appears in court on behalf of the OIG and its employees.

Management and Policy

The Office of Management and Policy provides financial management, procurement, human capital management, administrative, information technology, and communications expertise to the OIG.



During fiscal year (FY) 2010, Amtrak set a new ridership record, carrying 28,716,857 passengers on up to 305 daily intercity trains—at speeds of up to 150 mph (241 kph)—on more than 21,100 route miles serving 513 communities in 46 states, the District of Columbia, and three Canadian provinces.

Amtrak Profile

The National Railroad Passenger Corporation—Amtrak—is incorporated under the District of Columbia Business Corporation Act (D.C. Code § 29-301 et seq.) in accordance with the provisions of the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (P. L. 91-518). Under the provisions of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (P. L. 110-432; 49 U.S.C. § 24302), Amtrak’s Board of Directors was reorganized and expanded to nine members.

The company is operated and managed as a for-profit corporation providing intercity rail passenger transportation as its principal business. Congress created Amtrak in 1970 to take over, and independently operate, the nation’s intercity rail passenger services. Prior to this, America’s private freight companies ran passenger rail as required by federal law. Those companies reported that they had operated their passenger rail services without profit for a decade or more. With this in mind, when Amtrak began service on May 1, 1971, more than half of the rail passenger routes then operated by the freight railroad companies were eliminated.

Ridership Is Up

During fiscal year (FY) 2010, Amtrak set a new ridership record, carrying 28,716,857 passengers on up to 305 daily intercity trains—at speeds of up to 150 mph (241 kph)—on more than 21,100 route miles serving 513 communities in 46 states, the District of Columbia, and three Canadian provinces. More than 900,000 people also commute every weekday on Amtrak infrastructure or on Amtrak-operated commuter trains around the country under contracts with 15 states and four regional commuter authorities. Amtrak employs over 20,000 persons, of whom more than 16,000 are covered by labor agreements. These employees work in on-board services, maintenance of way, police, station and reservations services, and other support areas.

Amtrak collected a record \$1.74 billion in ticket revenue. When revenues from other sources such as real estate contracts and services for other railroads are included, Amtrak covered 84 percent of its operating costs in FY 2010. In terms of market share, Amtrak now enjoys 69 percent of the combined airline-intercity rail market between Washington, D.C., and New York City. The market share of the New York–Boston corridor increased from 50 percent in FY 2009 to 52 percent in FY 2010.

How It Works: Ownership and Contracting

Amtrak owns the right-of-way of more than 363 route miles in the Northeast Corridor (NEC, which includes Washington, D.C.–New York City–Boston; Philadelphia–Harrisburg; and New Haven, Conn.–Springfield, Mass.), as well as 97 miles in Michigan. Amtrak owns 105 station facilities, and is responsible for the upkeep and maintenance of an additional 181 station facilities and 411 platforms. Amtrak owns 17 tunnels and 1,186 bridges.

Amtrak owns most of the maintenance and repair facilities for its fleet of about 2,600 cars and locomotives. Outside of the NEC, Amtrak contracts with freight railroads for the right to operate over their tracks. The host railroads are responsible for the condition of their tracks and for the coordination of all railroad traffic.



Texas Eagle at Dallas



Mystic, Connecticut

Significant Activities: **ACTIONS UNDERWAY TO STRENGTHEN OIG OPERATIONS**

During this period we have continued to make significant progress in meeting our strategic priorities to promote positive change, maximize efficiency and value in our work, and lead by example in creating a model OIG organization. To help us achieve these goals, we engaged the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to conduct an organizational assessment. This assessment was intended to help us identify our core organizational strengths and weaknesses, then develop specific, prioritized actions to improve OIG processes, policies, and management practices.

We also made significant progress in strengthening our audit and evaluation policies and providing appropriate training and development opportunities for OIG staff.

NAPA's Organizational Assessment of the OIG

On August 31, 2010, NAPA reported the results of its assessment. The report included 41 recommendations addressing opportunities to improve in the following eight areas:

- Internal Communications
- External Communications
- Work Planning and Prioritization
- Quality and Timely Work Processes
- Independence
- Policy Management and Updates
- Human Capital Management
- Performance Measures

OIG senior leadership concurred with the immediate and longer-term recommendations in each area. We are currently assessing the actions needed to implement the recommendations and have set a goal to develop implementation plans for each area by the next semiannual reporting period. The plans will identify the desired outcomes, outputs, activities, resources, and milestones for enhancing our operations in each area.

Developing effective implementation plans will require a collaborative effort by all OIG employees. The senior leadership team will form teams consisting of employees from across the OIG to develop the plans. Given the importance of our efforts, we have again engaged NAPA to help the teams develop implementation plans for the four areas with the highest levels of priority.



Developing effective implementation plans will require a collaborative effort by all OIG employees.

- **Internal Communications.** NAPA found that, historically, Amtrak OIG culture inhibited information sharing and that limited communication among units fed an atmosphere of rumor, suspicion, and frustration. Field offices were not well integrated into the operations and have only limited communication or interaction with headquarters employees. As a first step to help address this issue, the OIG initiated semiannual all-hands meetings for October 2010.
- **Work Planning and Prioritization.** The report noted that the OIG had not centrally prioritized or coordinated its work to ensure alignment with the OIG's strategic direction and to provide maximum value and impact to Amtrak. While the OIG developed a strategic plan in early 2010, it still needs a process to objectively identify and prioritize Amtrak programs as potential subjects of audit, investigation, inspection, or evaluation.
- **Quality and Timely Work Processes.** Assessment data indicated that the lack of documented and well-understood processes, tools, and deadlines resulted in misaligned resources, inconsistent reporting formats, and inadequate accountability. The report also identified a strong desire among OIG staff for processes and structure, and noted that actions were underway to develop policy and process guidance and to provide training.
- **Performance Measures.** The report cited the importance of measuring performance at both the organizational and individual levels. The OIG leadership team recognizes the importance of establishing performance metrics that reflect the value of their work.

Relationship between Amtrak and the OIG

As detailed in our last *Semiannual Report*, a new relationship policy was formalized on March 4, 2010, between Amtrak management and the Amtrak OIG. In accordance with the Fiscal Year 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P. L. 111-117), Farm Credit Administration Inspector General Carl Clinefelter reviewed whether this relationship policy was consistent with the letter and spirit of the IG Act of 1978, as amended. He concluded that it was, enabling Amtrak and the OIG to build a constructive relationship, and further stated that Amtrak would benefit from “a properly functioning OIG that remains independent of Corporation programmatic activities.”

The Appropriations Act further called for another member of the Council of Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency to—one year after the initial determination—evaluate the Amtrak OIG’s operational independence. We will report on this evaluation in the next *Semiannual Report*.



Acela Express at Elizabeth, New Jersey

Ongoing Actions

In September 2009 the Legal Services Corporation’s OIG conducted a peer review of the Amtrak OIG’s system of quality control for the audit function, and made several recommendations. To respond to these, we have completed a number of significant actions; more are underway.



All audit reports must undergo a thorough quality control process for fact checking, supervisory review, and independent referencing.



Springfield, Massachusetts

Photo: Paul McGrane

First, we developed and issued a comprehensive audit and evaluation manual that conforms to the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) generally accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS), July 2007 revision. The manual addresses the quality control issues raised in the September 2009 audit peer review and the NAPA report. For example, all audit reports must undergo a thorough quality control process for fact checking, supervisory review, and independent referencing. We also provided training to all audit and evaluation staff on the new requirements.

Second, all audit and evaluation staff attended a training course in performance auditing. This was a first step in redirecting our audit resources from internal compliance audits and positioning staff to conduct more value-added assignments. We developed a training curriculum for auditors and evaluators that includes training in audit evidence and documentation and courses in report writing. These courses are scheduled for the next semiannual period.

Third, we developed and published a professional development and training policy for ensuring that professional employees in the OIG’s Audit and Inspections & Evaluations offices meet the continuing professional education (CPE) requirements prescribed in the government auditing standards, 2007 revision, including the requirement to maintain a tracking system for CPE hours.

Fourth, the OIG is also making progress in improving our investigative operations. A recent internal quality assessment review by an investigative consultant disclosed that our system of internal safeguards and management procedures were not in compliance with the quality standards established by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE). The report highlighted specific deficiencies that required correction before the OIG could obtain a rating of full compliance in a peer review; completion of such a review is required for implementing statutory law enforcement authority.

Under the Attorney General Guidelines for Offices of Inspector General with statutory law enforcement authority, each OIG must certify that every investigator who will be exercising law enforcement authority has completed the Criminal Investigator Training Program (CITP) at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), or an equivalent program. FLETC is an interagency law enforcement training organization under the Department of Homeland Security; it serves more than 80 federal, state, local, and international agencies. Currently, after each investigator completes the CITP course, the OIG applies for that investigator's special deputation from the United States Marshals Service. Six of our criminal investigators have received this special deputation, which gives the criminal investigators law enforcement authority to make arrests, execute search warrants, and carry firearms.

Applications for special deputation are pending for two additional criminal investigators. After all of the criminal investigators have completed CITP, and the Office of Investigations has met the other prerequisites established in the Attorney General guidelines, we will seek statutory law enforcement authority.



Père Marquette at St. Joseph, Michigan



The meeting of the two Starlights at Bradley, California

Significant Activities:

AUDITS

This reporting period, the Office of Audits continued to conduct a wide range of independent and objective audits and reviews of Amtrak's programs to help Amtrak operate more effectively and to protect the corporation from fraud, waste, and abuse.

Audits Issued This Reporting Period

This section provides summaries of audits issued during this reporting period. The full reports can be accessed through the OIG website at www.amtrakoig.gov.

BNSF On-Time Performance Incentives: Inaccurate Invoices and Lack of Amtrak Management Review Lead to Overpayments

(Audit Report 407-2003, September 24, 2010)

Questioned Costs: \$1,055,662
Funds to be Put to Better Use: 240,000

Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF) billed Amtrak over \$11 million from October 2001 through April 2002 for on-time performance (OTP) incentives for operating passenger trains on time more than 80 percent of the time during a month. Our objectives were to determine whether BNSF complied with the operating agreement, which provides the basis for performance payments, and to evaluate the adequacy of Amtrak's oversight and controls over monthly OTP invoices.

BNSF has a responsibility to comply with the terms of the operating agreement by accurately billing and supporting the amount billed for OTP incentive payments and services. However, we found that Amtrak overpaid BNSF \$1,055,662 for OTP incentives because BNSF did not comply with the operating agreement. Inaccurate claims for tolerances accounted for nearly half of all exceptions identified; incorrect run times accounted for the remaining exceptions.



Management authorized relief requests and paid BNSF almost \$240,000 for delays that were not covered by the operating agreement.

Amtrak's Transportation Operations Management group did not have an OTP calculation process during the audit period. Instead, management relied on BNSF employees to calculate the OTP incentives and prepare the bill. Management also did not perform a complete and thorough review to verify the accuracy of BNSF's monthly billings prior to approving them for payment.

We also found that management authorized relief requests and paid BNSF almost \$240,000 for delays that were not covered by the operating agreement. These funds represent funds that could have been put to better use by Amtrak to meet its operational needs. Funds lost to relief letters cannot be recovered because Amtrak managers authorized the relief requests. Further, we concluded that continuing to allow overpayments and authorizing relief requests was undermining Amtrak's goal of implementing a simplified and automated OTP billing process.

We recommended that Amtrak

- recover the \$1,055,662 it overpaid for OTP incentives;
- develop and implement a criterion-based process for consistently reviewing and approving relief requests; and
- develop a simplified and automated OTP billing process.

Management agreed with our findings and generally agreed with our draft recommendations or their intent, and offered an alternative approach to address our second recommendation.

**American Recovery & Reinvestment Act of 2009:
Assessment of Project Risks Associated with Key Engineering Projects**
(Audit Report 912-2010, May 14, 2010)

As part of our obligations under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), we assessed the risks associated with nine major ARRA-funded projects being managed by Amtrak's Engineering Department and the measures being taken to deal with those risks. These projects had a budget value totaling \$277 million.

A significant number of risk items were either directly or indirectly attributed to the Federal Railroad Administration grant agreement provision that requires Amtrak to complete all ARRA-funded projects no later than February 17, 2011. These included (1) the ability to complete the project before the February 17,

2011, grant deadline; (2) environmental concerns; and (3) schedule concerns. In many cases, the project managers were able to identify actions to mitigate risks. The Amtrak project managers appeared to understand the measures that must be used to mitigate the associated project risks and had begun to implement the majority of them. However, Amtrak managers and executives are not in a position to mitigate the most significant risk, the grant requirement that Amtrak take “extraordinary measures” in order to justify a request for relief from the project deadline. This requirement may have the unintended consequence of encouraging Amtrak to take actions that increase the risk of waste and inefficiency or even to take shortcuts that could increase the risk that the project will not perform as well as expected and will not provide the benefits expected.

As a result, as projects faced delays that threatened the completion date, Amtrak executives had to either cancel the project and identify a substitute that could be completed in time, or take “extraordinary measures” to meet the completion date. Identifying substitute projects at this point also increases risks and might result in funding lower-priority projects that would bring fewer benefits than the originally selected project.

Extraordinary measures that have been proposed by Amtrak include the addition of second or even third shifts on construction projects, reducing the scope of projects to accomplish less than originally planned, and dividing projects into two phases, one funded from ARRA funds and the second, post February 17, 2011, using Amtrak general capital funds.

Because the grant agreement is driving these “extraordinary measures” rather than the law, we recommended that Amtrak apply to FRA to amend the grant provisions. The grant provisions should ensure a balance between spending taxpayer funds in a timely manner and achieving project objectives, without actions that could increase the potential for waste or inefficiency.

We also recommended that Amtrak apply to FRA for a grant waiver in instances in which reasonable measures have failed to bring the project within the grant deadline. Management agreed with the report’s findings and concurred with all of the recommendations. In August the grant agreement waiver provision was amended.



We also recommended that Amtrak apply to FRA for a grant waiver in instances in which reasonable measures have failed to bring the project within the grant deadline. In August the grant agreement waiver provision was amended.



California Zephyr at Thompson, Utah

Ongoing Audits

During the next six months, the Office of Audits will focus broadly on information technology, financial reporting, procurement, vendor payments, American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)-funded projects, and Americans with Disabilities Act projects.

Key audit reports expected to be completed include the following:

- An audit of Amtrak's planning, implementation approach, and program management for the Strategic Asset Management (SAM) program. This is Amtrak's most significant information technology program to improve the economy, effectiveness, and efficiency of its support and business operations and is estimated to have an implementation cost of up to \$380 million.
- An audit of the adequacy of accounting practices related to financial reporting for inventory purchases.
- A review of the cost proposal for the \$466-million purchase of new locomotives. The audit results will help Amtrak in its contract negotiations and future considerations of proposed contract modifications.
- Incurred-cost audits of contracts valued at over \$3 million for repair of maintenance facilities and track replacements and improvements. These audits will identify questioned and unsupported costs.
- Audits of invoices billed to Amtrak for performance payments to other railroads. These invoices allowed over \$60 million in awards payments. Similar past audits have identified significant overpayments.
- A review of 40 ARRA-funded projects expected to cost about \$465 million. These projects are being implemented by a contractor on behalf of Amtrak. The audit will address the adequacy of Amtrak's program management oversight and status of project implementation, as well as obstacles to completing the projects by the ARRA deadline of February 17, 2011.
- An audit of 35 police and security ARRA-funded projects expected to cost \$95 million. The audit will address the adequacy of Amtrak's program management and the status of project implementation, as well as obstacles to completing the projects by the ARRA deadline of February 17, 2011.
- A review of Amtrak's progress in complying with the Americans with Disabilities Act. The audit will address what has been and remains to be done, as well as barriers that must be overcome to achieve further progress.

Significant Activities: INSPECTIONS AND EVALUATIONS

During this reporting period, the Office of Inspections and Evaluations issued an evaluation of Amtrak's strategic planning, summarized below.



While the establishment of an executive leadership team to “create the future service and organizational vision for the company” is a positive and important move forward, the effort did not incorporate the key elements of a strategic planning process and did not explicitly call for the development of a strategic plan.

Amtrak's Strategic Planning

(Report E-10-01, August 17, 2010)

In June 2010, Amtrak announced a new initiative, to convene an executive leadership group to “create the future service and organizational vision for the company.” Prior to this announcement, OIG had completed an extensive review of current models and practices in strategic planning. Based on Amtrak's announcement of this new initiative, we decided to share with management our observations of how Amtrak's current plans and proposed new initiative compared with the industry best practices that we identified. On July 29, 2010, we briefed Amtrak's senior executive leadership team on our observations and recommendations.

In a 2005 report, the Government Accountability Office concluded that “Amtrak lacks a meaningful strategic plan that provides a clear mission and measurable corporate-wide goals, strategies, and outcomes to guide the organization.” Since that report, Amtrak has struggled to implement an effective strategic planning process. Although multiple planning efforts were initiated between 2005 and 2009, none resulted in a comprehensive strategic plan. In October 2009, after a change in Amtrak leadership, the corporation took a significant step forward in issuing strategic guidance and a 5-year financial plan. Amtrak recognized that, while important, these documents still did not represent a comprehensive strategic plan.

We found that Developing a strategic plan could assist Amtrak's leadership in effectively aligning organizational efforts around a single vision and ensuring the effective use of resources. Further, the process helps leaders make choices on strategic initiatives and determine priorities. From there, it fosters the

development of realistic program and project plans, and therefore increases goal attainment. It also serves as a communications tool for all stakeholders, and helps facilitate mid-course corrections by focusing on end goals.

We recommended that Amtrak develop a strategic plan utilizing a strategic planning process that incorporates the key elements of effective strategic planning. In commenting on a draft of this report, Amtrak management agreed with this recommendation and committed to preparing a timeline for the development of a strategic plan by October 19, 2010.

Ongoing Evaluations

Operation RedBlock Follow-up

Operation RedBlock is a labor-developed, management-supported program to promote the awareness and education of drug and alcohol use in the workplace through union-led volunteer prevention committees. In March 2008 we issued a report that identified significant deficiencies in the program and made 14 recommendations to improve Operation RedBlock's operational and organizational efficiency and effectiveness. Amtrak disagreed with many of the recommendations, and asserted that the program was operating effectively, but did not provide additional information. Our objective in this follow-up review is to determine the progress made in implementing our previous recommendations.

Amtrak Strategic Fleet Planning

In February 2010, Amtrak published a fleet strategy outlining the need to spend \$23 billion over the next 30 years to replace aging equipment and to provide the fleet necessary to meet projected ridership demands. In May 2010, we were asked to conduct a comprehensive review of this strategy by the Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies. Our specific objective is to assess whether the critical data and assumptions having a material impact on the plan's equipment and financial resource are reasonable and valid.

Mechanical Maintenance Operations Follow-up

In our September 2005 report, we made 34 recommendations to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of Amtrak's mechanical maintenance program. One of our major recommendations was that Amtrak adopt a more modern maintenance philosophy based on reliability-centered maintenance. Our objective in this follow-up is to evaluate the progress that has been made since 2005 and identify continued opportunities to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of Amtrak's mechanical maintenance operations.



In February 2010, Amtrak published a fleet strategy outlining the need to spend \$23 billion over the next 30 years to replace aging equipment and to provide the fleet necessary to meet projected ridership demands.



Acela Express at Hellgate Bridge, New York City

Significant Activities: INVESTIGATIONS

During this reporting period, the Office of Investigations continued to work on a variety of cases of alleged fraud, waste, and abuse of Amtrak funds and resources. Investigators opened 22 new cases and closed 133, and our hotline received 151 contacts by email, fax, letter, website, or telephone. Our work resulted in four convictions, one indictment, the removal of one employee, and the suspension of two others.

The office began this semiannual reporting period with an inventory of over 300 cases, many of which had sat dormant for years without investigative activity or supervisory review. Most addressed administrative matters more appropriately handled by Amtrak management. Other open cases were resolved but awaiting full payment of court-ordered restitution. As a result of improved supervision and case management, we are progressing in closing out the dormant cases so that we may fully focus our attention on matters having a greater impact on Amtrak's programs and operations.

Cardiologist Sentenced for Health Care Fraud

(Report 08-096, August 11, 2010)

Restitution of \$575,922 ordered

A cardiologist provided false information and billed Medicare and other insurers \$13 million for medical services that were never rendered to patients. The cardiologist used the proceeds to live a lavish lifestyle, purchasing a suburban mansion, property in Arizona, luxury automobiles, and investing in various venture capital opportunities.

The physician carried out this scheme by using his hospital privileges to access and obtain information about patients without their knowledge or consent.

The cardiologist hired individuals to bill Medicare and other insurance providers for medical services that he purportedly rendered to patients whom he never



The cardiologist used the proceeds to live a lavish lifestyle, purchasing a suburban mansion, property in Arizona, luxury automobiles, and investing in various venture capital opportunities.

treated. He submitted more than 14,800 false claims for reimbursement for providing the highest level of cardiac care in an intensive care unit on multiple days during patients' hospital stays.

Of the \$13 million falsely billed, the cardiologist billed Amtrak \$591,285 for critical cardiac care services that were not rendered. The investigation was conducted by a multi-agency task force that included the FBI and numerous Offices of Inspectors General. In August of 2010, the cardiologist was sentenced to five years in federal prison and was ordered to pay restitution totaling approximately \$13 million to Medicare and other public and private health care insurance programs. Amtrak's share of the restitution was \$575,922.

Amtrak Employee and Contractor Convicted of Theft

(Reports 08-003 and 09-006, August 17, 2010)

Restitution of \$223,451 ordered

OIG received information concerning the possible theft of credit card funds from the Amtrak Manual Credit Card System (MCCS). An investigation discovered that an Amtrak employee, who worked with the MCCS account, had credited nearly \$151,000 to his personal credit card account. The individual pled guilty in U.S. District Court to a felony charge of theft from a program receiving federal funds. In April 2010, the employee was sentenced to three years' probation, 90 days' home confinement, 250 hours of community service, and was ordered to pay restitution to Amtrak of \$150,964.

The source who reported the theft also provided information that an Amtrak contractor received more than \$72,000 worth of Amtrak credits to his personal credit cards. The contractor pled guilty to receiving stolen property and on June 24, 2010, was sentenced to five years' probation, a fine of \$3,000, and ordered to pay restitution of \$72,487.

As a result of these cases, Amtrak's Finance Department developed procedures designed to prevent future manipulation of the MCCS account by employees and provide improved oversight of system use.

Passenger Used Inactive Credit Card to Purchase Tickets

(Report 08-148, August 17, 2010)

Restitution of \$2,565 ordered

OIG received information that an Amtrak passenger was using an inactive credit card to purchase tickets over an 18 month period, resulting in lost revenue to Amtrak of \$2,565. Agents found that the passenger had used the credit card

33 times to purchase Amtrak tickets from conductors on board the train. The passenger pled guilty to theft and in July 2010 was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of \$2,565 to Amtrak.

Theft from Minneapolis/St. Paul Ticket Office

(Report 10-128, August 17, 2010)

OIG received information that an Amtrak ticket agent may have stolen cash from the Minneapolis/St. Paul ticket office. Agents substantiated the allegation, and the ticket agent admitted stealing \$30,050 from Amtrak and resigned from his position. The ticket agent died prior to charges being filed.

Amtrak Employee Suspended for Claiming Time Not Worked

(Report 09-036, August 17, 2010)

OIG received information that a Southampton (Mass.) maintenance facility employee was being paid for overtime not worked. Through a review of company records and interviews, we determined that on nine occasions when the employee claimed to be at work at the facility, the employee was elsewhere in the Boston area. At an administrative hearing in August 2010, the employee was found to have violated the Trust and Honesty section of Amtrak's Standards of Excellence and was assessed a 15-day suspension, return of the company-issued laptop and cellular telephone, and removal from special assignment.

Tuition Assistance Wrongfully Obtained

(Report 10-073, August 17, 2010)

Reimbursement to Amtrak of \$1,976

OIG received information that an Amtrak station clerk received tuition assistance from Amtrak to attend college while on a medical leave of absence. The station clerk graduated from the University of Texas at El Paso with a degree in engineering and gained employment with a defense contractor in Phoenix while on medical leave from Amtrak.

Amtrak policy dictates that an employee must be in an "active employment status" at the beginning and throughout the course of study to be eligible to receive tuition reimbursement. We determined that the station clerk had received \$2,482 in tuition reimbursement while on medical leave. Management charged the station clerk with abandoning his position. The station clerk resigned his position with Amtrak in August 2010, and forfeited \$1,976 of vacation pay, which was due upon his resignation.

Amtrak Employee Charged With Theft

(Report 09-002, August 23, 2010)

Employee Arrested and Indicted

A track inspector used Amtrak's GSA credit card to purchase fuel for his personal vehicle on multiple occasions. The fuel purchased was valued at a minimum of \$2,000. The track inspector was indicted by a Maryland grand jury for theft and was arrested on August 20, 2010. The track inspector was suspended from service pending an administrative hearing. He eventually pled guilty.



The Office of Investigations developed a fraud awareness training program that will be made available to Amtrak employees and contractors throughout the corporation.

Revenue Protection Unit

During this reporting period, in conjunction with random on-board train observations of lead service attendants (LSAs), the Office of Investigations' Revenue Protection Unit (RPU) analyzed supporting documentation for on-board food and beverage sales for 69 trains. The reviews resulted in 11 administrative referrals to management consisting of various issues including theft, fraud, and failure to follow procedures. By the end of this reporting period, discipline had been assessed against seven LSAs, ranging from counseling to termination.

In an effort to inform Amtrak personnel of the mission of the RPU and the importance of adhering to internal controls to prevent losses of revenue from on-board food and beverage sales, RPU gave eight presentations to a total of 89 newly hired or promoted assistant conductors.

Fraud Awareness Training

The Office of Investigations developed a fraud awareness training program that will be made available to Amtrak employees and contractors throughout the corporation. Tips from individuals who recognize indications of fraudulent activity are some of the best sources available to fraud investigators. This is a proactive effort to educate the workforce on the mission and role of the OIG and provide information about fraud and examples of fraud indicators. This training will provide valuable information to help employees and contractors detect fraud in contracts, recognize fraudulent schemes in projects and procurements, and spot indicators of financial fraud.

Significant Activities: TESTIMONY AND LEGISLATIVE ISSUES

Inspector General Testimony April 29, 2010

Inspector General Ted Alves testified before the Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies, Senate Committee on Appropriations, regarding Amtrak's fiscal year 2011 operating and capital budget request. The IG discussed significant challenges Amtrak faces in providing increased levels of high-quality passenger rail services, and the challenges it must address to take advantage of these opportunities.

The IG noted that the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act (PRIIA) not only reauthorized Amtrak, but fundamentally changed Amtrak's role within the national passenger rail system. PRIIA contains many provisions aimed at encouraging Amtrak to operate more efficiently and to improve services on its existing routes. Rather than relying on Amtrak to lead the development of new intercity passenger rail service alone, PRIIA calls on the states, supported with federal grants, to share in the development of new corridor services and high-speed rail services. As a result, Amtrak should become one of many choices that states have to provide rail service, rather than the only practical option.

Amtrak has many competitive advantages, including its statutory access to host railroads, existing liability regime, and experience in planning, engineering, maintenance, and operations. For example, Amtrak already operates several commuter rail routes in key markets and has a nationwide reservation system that can be extended to support new services, allowing significant economies of scale. Amtrak can leverage these advantages to help states plan for these new services and to become the operator of choice for new services.



Amtrak will need to operate more efficiently in order to compete successfully for state-supported services.

—Inspector General
Ted Alves
at Senate Appropriations
Committee hearing,
April 29, 2010

The Inspector General noted that as Amtrak moves into this era of passenger rail it faces four inter-related management challenges:

- Amtrak will need to operate more efficiently in order to compete successfully for state-supported services.
- Amtrak will need to improve its human capital management practices by focusing on strategic workforce planning and identifying its critical skills and competencies.
- Amtrak will need to manage the risks associated with modernizing its information technology systems and infrastructure.
- Amtrak will need to manage the risks associated with projects funded through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA).

Legislative Issues

We received an April 8, 2010, letter from the Ranking Member of the Senate Finance Committee and the Ranking Member of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, requesting information about instances of interference with OIG operations, a list of reports not publicly disclosed, and the status of recommendations. In response, we reported on the IG's efforts to ensure that the Amtrak OIG is positioned to operate independently, without interference from management, and—equally important—to operate effectively, with policies, procedures, and practices that support a high-performing OIG operation.

- We reported that Amtrak management and the OIG have made significant progress in solidifying their relationship by developing a new relationship policy that fully meets the letter and the spirit of the IG Act, withdrawing the OIG from performing management functions, and rebuilding relationships among Amtrak and OIG managers and staff.
- We provided a listing of unsubstantiated OIG investigations closed from January 1, 2009 through April 30, 2010.
- We stated that we were not able to respond to the request for information on the scope and status of Amtrak OIG's outstanding recommendations given the lack of reliable historical information.

We are committed to developing a system to track the status of outstanding recommendations during the next semiannual reporting period.

FY 2010 Performance Measures, 4/1/2010–9/30/2010

Audit Results

Congressional Testimony	1
Reports Issued	2
Evaluations Issued	1
Costs Questioned/Funds to be Put to Better Use	\$1,295,662
Management Decisions to Seek Recoveries	1,055,662

Investigative Results

Financial Impact

Fines (and Special Assessments)	\$3,300
Restitution	801,938
Recoveries	65,317

Judicial and Administrative Actions

Indictments	1
Convictions	4
Employee Removal	1
Employee Suspensions	2

Investigative Workload

Investigations Opened	22
Investigations Closed	133

Hotline Contacts

Email	4
Fax	11
Letter	44
Web	20
Telephone	72
Total	151

Advisory Functions

FOIA Requests Received	1
FOIA Requests Processed	1
Legislation Reviewed	0
Regulations Reviewed	0



Diridon Station, San Jose, California

Appendixes

APPENDIX 1

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT REPORTS ISSUED WITH QUESTIONED COSTS

Reporting Period: 4/1/10–9/30/10

	Number	Questioned Costs	Unsupported Costs
A. For which no management decision has been made by the commencement of the reporting period.	1	\$20,052,519	\$0
B. Reports issued during the reporting period.	1	\$1,055,662	\$0
Subtotals (A + B)	2	\$21,108,181	\$0
Less			
C. For which a management decision was made during the reporting period.	0		
(i) dollar value of recommendations that were agreed to by management.			\$0
(ii) dollar value of recommendations that were not agreed to by management.			\$0
D. For which no management decision has been made by the end of the reporting period.	2	\$21,108,181	\$0

APPENDIX 2

**OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
AUDIT REPORTS ISSUED WITH FUNDS TO BE PUT TO BETTER USE**

Reporting Period: 4/1/10–9/30/10

	Number	Dollar Value
A. For which no management decision has been made by the commencement of the reporting period.	1	\$240,000
B. Reports issued during the reporting period.	0	\$0
Subtotals (A + B)	0	\$240,000
Less	0	
C. For which a management decision was made during the reporting period.		
(i) dollar value of recommendations that were agreed to by management.	0	\$0
(ii) dollar value of recommendations that were not agreed to by management.	0	\$0
D. For which no management decision has been made by the end of the reporting period.	0	\$0

APPENDIX 3

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
DETAILED LISTING OF ALL ISSUED REPORTS

Reporting Period: 4/1/10–9/30/10

Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Questioned Costs	Unsupported Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use
5/14/2010	912-2010	American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009	\$0	\$0	\$0
8/17/2010	E-10-01	Amtrak Strategic Plan	\$0	\$0	\$0
9/24/2010	407-2003	BNSF On-time Performance Incentives	\$1,055,662	\$0	\$240,000
Total			\$1,055,662	\$0	\$240,000

Audits	
Audits in progress at 4/1/2010:	68
Audits postponed or canceled:	6
Audits started:	3
Audits in progress at 9/30/2010:	65

APPENDIX 4

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

MANAGEMENT'S COMMITMENT TO SEEK FINAL ACTION ON AUDITS WITH AGREED QUESTIONED COSTS AND FUNDS TO BE PUT TO BETTER USE (FBPTBU)

Reporting Period: 4/1/10–9/30/10

	Number	Questioned Costs	Number	Unsupported Costs
A. Agreed Questioned Costs and FBPTBU for which management action is needed at the beginning of the reporting period.	0	\$0	0	\$0
B. Agreed Questioned Costs and FBPTBU for which management action is needed during the reporting period.	0	\$0	0	\$0
Subtotals (A + B)	0	\$0	0	\$0
C. Management actions taken during the reporting period.	0	\$0	0	
(1) Collections (Cost recovery)				
(2) Cost avoidance (Contracts)				
(3) Adjusted material value (Inventory parts)				
(4) Future cost savings (Improved management controls)				
(5) Management reduction of costs (Negotiation)				
(6) More efficient use of funds (FBPTBU)				
(7) Management reduction of costs (Additional evidence)				
(8) Management unwilling to pursue				
(9) Management unwilling to pursue (FBPTBU)				
Subtotals (1 – 9) of management actions		\$0	0	\$0
D. Agreed Questioned Costs and FBPTBU for which management action is needed at the end of the reporting period.	0	\$0	0	\$0

APPENDIX 5

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUMMARY OF REPORTS TO THE PRESIDENT OF AMTRAK CONCERNING INFORMATION OR ASSISTANCE UNREASONABLY REFUSED OR NOT PROVIDED

Reporting Period: 4/1/10–9/30/10

Nothing to report this period

APPENDIX 6

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS

Reporting Period: 4/1/10–9/30/10

Section 4(a) of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, provides that the Inspector General shall review existing and proposed legislation and regulations relating to programs and operations of such establishment and to make recommendations in the semiannual reports...concerning the impact of such legislation or regulations on the economy and efficiency in the administration of such programs and operations administered or financed by such establishment or the prevention and detection of fraud and abuse in such programs and operations.

Furthermore, Section 4(a) states that it is “the duty and responsibility of the Inspector General “to recommend policies for, and to conduct, supervise, or coordinate relationships between such establishment and other Federal agencies, State and local governmental agencies, and nongovernmental entities with respect to (A) all matters relating to the promotion of economy and efficiency in the administration of, or the prevention and detection of fraud and abuse in, programs and operations administered or financed by such establishment, or (B) the identification and prosecution of participants in such fraud or abuse.”

There was no legislation or any regulations reviewed during this reporting period.

GLOSSARY OF AUDIT TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

The terms the OIG uses in reporting audit statistics are defined below:

Questioned Cost – Cost or expenditure of funds for an intended purpose that is unnecessary, unreasonable, or an alleged violation of Amtrak’s corporate policy or procedure.

Unsupported Cost – Cost that is not supported by adequate documentation at the time of the audit.

Funds to Be Put to Better Use – Funds identified in an audit that could be used more effectively by taking greater efficiency measures.

Management Decision – Management’s evaluation of the OIG audit finding and its final decision concerning agreement or non-agreement with the OIG recommendation.

Abbreviations/acronyms used in the text are defined below:

ARRA	American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
BNSF	Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Co.
CEO	chief operating officer
CFO	chief financial officer
CIGIE	Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
CITP	Criminal Investigator Training Program
COO	chief operating officer
CPE	continuing professional education
D.C.	District of Columbia
FBPTBU	Funds to Be Put to Better Use
FLETC	Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
FRA	Federal Railroad Administration
FY	fiscal year
GAGAS	generally accepted government auditing standards
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GSA	General Services Administration
HAF	hotel authorization form
IG	Inspector General
LSA	lead service attendant
MCCS	Manual Credit Card System
NAPA	National Academy of Public Administration
NEC	Northeast Corridor
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OTP	on-time performance
P.L.	Public Law
PRIIA	Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act
R&R	repair and return
RCM	reliability-centered maintenance
RPU	Revenue Protection Unit
SAM	strategic asset management
U.S.C.	United States Code

Reporting Requirements Index

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The OIG will keep your identity confidential. You may remain anonymous if you so choose. You are protected by law from reprisal by your employer.

Call the Amtrak OIG Hotline

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