

**NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT**

TITLE: Theft
CASE NUMBER: 06-124
DATE OF REPORT: December 15, 2008
REPORT PREPARED BY: SA [REDACTED] *gk*



Other Activity (Describe): Closing Report

Allegation:

The Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations (OI) received an allegation concerning the theft of Amtrak materials through alleged computer manipulation by employees at the [REDACTED]. The complaint alleges that a [REDACTED] employee named [REDACTED] has ordered parts under a manager's access code on the computer. Once received, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] would steal the parts and use them for [REDACTED]'s electrical business, which he operates outside his employment with Amtrak. According to the allegation, the manager's access code [REDACTED] uses belongs to [REDACTED] and he [REDACTED] is unaware of [REDACTED]'s actions.

After completing its investigation, OI confirmed that [REDACTED] had shared his access code with another employee, and that this employee had used the code to order parts. OI, however, could not confirm the substance of the allegation, namely, that [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] ordered parts with [REDACTED]'s access code.

Findings:

On February 23, 2007, OI interviewed [REDACTED] in reference to the above-referenced allegations (Exhibit 1). [REDACTED] stated that he did not have much to do with ordering materials for the projects, such as overhauling the wiring within the train car and installing 480 cables underneath the cars. [REDACTED] further stated that the shift foreman do most of the ordering for the projects. According to [REDACTED] authorized employees can order material from the storehouse by using the Link One (1) program, template program or by filling out a 2070 form.

[REDACTED] disclosed that, normally, he did not share his Link One (1) access code with any other employees, but once last week (i.e., the week of February 12th, 2007) he shared his code with a Mechanical employee, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] admitted that there was a flaw in the Link One (1) system, the flaw was that after a transaction was completed a receipt would be printed out showing the

ordered items as well as the computer access code that was used to order the materials. [REDACTED] added that anyone walking by the printer could see the access code.¹

In March 2007, OI received a spreadsheet detailing all of the materials that were ordered through the ASAP Link One (1) system with [REDACTED]'s access code from February 6, 2006, to December 29, 2006. This spreadsheet was provided to [REDACTED] for review on March 8, 2007.

Also in March 2007, [REDACTED] completed his review of the spreadsheet and indicated that he did not purchase 95% of the items listed under his Link One (1) access code.

In August 2008, OI interviewed [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was asked if he knew about the Amtrak computer security and usage policy, and he answered that he never received the policy and has not seen it. [REDACTED] was asked if he was familiar with the Link One (1) system and if he used it frequently. [REDACTED] replied that he was provided an access code in 2000 and that being a lead man, he is able to order any materials that are needed. [REDACTED] admitted that he received very little training on how to use Link One (1) to order materials. [REDACTED] continued by stating that other crafts come to him and he orders materials for them as well. [REDACTED] admitted that foremen are supposed to complete the orders, but they are sometimes hard to find in the building. [REDACTED] stated that an Amtrak employee does not have to sign for any of the materials that are dropped off. [REDACTED] further stated that sometimes he would have to go looking for the ordered materials in a different location because material control delivered the items to the wrong location. [REDACTED] explained that this would cause unnecessary delays to the work they were assigned.

[REDACTED] denied any involvement in the use of a Manager's access code to order materials. [REDACTED] was asked if he knew of any employees that he works with that have an electrical business outside of Amtrak, he answered that [REDACTED] has an electrical business. [REDACTED] stated that he worked for [REDACTED] when he was furloughed in 2001, but has not spoken to him for over a year. [REDACTED] further stated that [REDACTED] never asked him to order materials from Amtrak for his [REDACTED]'s personal business.

Also in August 2008, OI interviewed [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was asked if he knew about the Amtrak computer security and usage policy, and he answered that he never received the policy and has not seen it. [REDACTED] was asked if he was familiar with the Link One (1) system and if he used it frequently. [REDACTED] replied that he does not have an access code and that his foreman usually orders the materials.

[REDACTED] denied any involvement in the use of an Amtrak Manager's code to order materials for outside of Amtrak. [REDACTED] explained that material control makes a delivery to a specified location and that the employees retrieve the parts that are needed for a certain project. [REDACTED] stated that you do not have to sign for the materials. [REDACTED] further stated that frequently he has had to go

¹ [REDACTED]'s actions as described above violated Amtrak's Computer Security and Usage policy under section 4.1.2.1. [REDACTED] was advised by OI to change his password and to adhere by the Amtrak Computer Security and Usage policy of not sharing your password with anyone.

looking for the materials that were ordered because material control mistakenly dropped them off at the wrong location. [REDACTED] explained that this would cause unnecessary delays to the work they were assigned.

While [REDACTED] admitted to owning his own side electrical business with his wife, he asserted that he has not worked this side business since late 2006.


Comments:

On September 30, 2008, OI sent the Management referral to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED].

On December 5, 2008, OI received [REDACTED]'s response (See Attached). As of result of OI's recommendations, [REDACTED] reported that [REDACTED], [REDACTED], will be responsible to issue copies of Amtrak's Computer Security and Usage policy 3.1.0 to all employees and assure all are briefed on topic including frequently changing of computer access passwords as described in the Amtrak employee Security handbook. [REDACTED] explained that they currently have an electronic requisition material report available in the Work Management system; however they are developing an additional canned report that will provide the ability for an individual user to review all material orders by his or her User-id by March 31, 2009. [REDACTED] also acknowledged that [REDACTED] will assure that all employees who are authorized to order materials are properly trained in Link-One.

Recommendation:

With the response by Amtrak Management it is recommended that this case be closed pending the development of further information.



Supervisor's Signature: [REDACTED]

Regional Supervisor's Signature: [Handwritten Signature]

Deputy Inspector General/Counsel's Signature: [Handwritten Signature]

CUA 12/17/2008