OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

March 27, 2013

The Honorable Theodore Alves Inspector General Amtrak Office of Inspector General 10 G Street, NE, Suite 3W-300 Washington, DC 20002

Dear Mr. Alves:

Enclosed is the final report regarding the Quality Assessment Review (QAR) of the Investigative Operations of the Amtrak Office of the Inspector General. This report includes the Opinion Letter and the Letter of Suggested Improvements/Best Practices.

I would like to thank you and your staff for the support and cooperation extended to the QAR team throughout the review process.

Sincerely,

Ku-Hubert T. Bell

Inspector General

Enclosures: As stated

OF THE INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS OF THE AMTRAK OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL



Conducted at Washington, District of Columbia, and other locations

by

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Inspector General Washington, DC 20555-0001

The Honorable Hubert T. Bell Jr., Inspector General William B. Borden III, Team Leader

March 2013

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March 27, 2013

The Honorable Theodore Alves
Inspector General
Amtrak Office of Inspector General
10 G Street, NE, Suite 3W-300
Washington, DC 20002

Re: Opinion Letter from the Quality Assessment Review of the Investigative Operations of the Amtrak Office of the Inspector General.

Dear Mr. Alves:

We have completed our review of internal safeguards and management procedures for the investigative function of the Amtrak Office of the Inspector General (OIG) for the period ending February 28, 2013. Our review was conducted in conformity with the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Quality Standards for Investigations and the Attorney General's Guidelines for Offices of Inspector General with Statutory Law Enforcement Authority, as applicable.

We reviewed compliance with Amtrak OIG's system of internal policies and procedures to the extent we considered them appropriate. Our review was conducted at the Amtrak OIG headquarters location in Washington, District of Columbia; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Chicago, Illinois; and Los Angeles, California. We interviewed 23 special agents and support staff assigned to the OIG. Additionally, we reviewed 20 case files for investigations closed during the previous 12-month period.

In performing our review, we have given consideration to the prerequisites of Section 6(e) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (as amended) and Section 812 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-296).

In our opinion, the system of internal safeguards and management procedures for the investigative function of the Amtrak OIG in effect for the year ending February 28, 2013, is in compliance with the quality standards established by the CIGIE and the Attorney

General's Guidelines. These safeguards and procedures followed by your office provide reasonable assurance of conforming with professional standards in the conduct of its investigations

Sincerely,

Hubert T. Bell Inspector General

INSPECTOR GENERAL

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

March 27, 2013

The Honorable Theodore Alves Inspector General Amtrak Office of Inspector General 10 G Street, NE, Suite 3W-300 Washington, DC 20002

Re: Letter of Suggested Improvements/Best Practices from the Quality Assessment Review of the Investigative Operations of the Amtrak Office of the Inspector General.

Dear Mr. Alves:

We have reviewed the internal safeguards and management procedures for the investigative function of the Amtrak Office of the Inspector General in effect for the period ending February 28, 2013. You have been furnished a report revealing the degree of compliance with applicable standards. This letter should be read in conjunction with that information, but this letter does not change that report.

Our review was conducted for the purpose of reporting on the Amtrak OIG's internal safeguards and management procedures and the staff's compliance with those standards. The review was conducted in conformity with the standards and guidelines established by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency and the Attorney General's Guidelines for Offices of Inspector General with Statutory Law Enforcement Authority, as applicable.

During our assessment, we reviewed 20 case files for investigations closed between March 1, 2012, and February 28, 2013. Enclosure 1 lists the review locations and number of personnel interviewed. Enclosure 2 lists the closed investigative files reviewed. Enclosure 3 is a discussion of areas where, in our view, improvements should be considered, and best practices observed and learned.

Sincerely,

Inspector General

Review Locations

Locations included in the Assessment:

Office Locations	Number of Personnel Interviewed
Amtrak Headquarters 10 G Street NE, Suite 3E-400 Washington, DC 20002	1 <u>1</u> ·
Eastern Division Amtrak OIG 30 th Street Station Philadelphia, PA 19104	5
Central Division Amtrak OIG 500 W. Jackson Blvd., 3 rd Floor Chicago, IL 60661	4
Western Division Amtrak OIG 810 N. Alameda Los Angeles, CA 90012	3

Review of Closed Investigative Files (March 1, 2012 – February 28, 2013)

Case File Number	Case Closing Date
DC-11-0145-HL-P	03/12/12
MD-09-0005-S	03/20/12
MD-11-0005-P	03/20/12
PA-11-0101-O	04/23/12
DC-12-0129-O	06/05/12
MA-11-0075-P	. 06/06/12
DĈ-11-0291-O	06/13/12
NY-12-0084-O	06/13/12
PA-12-0280-Z	06/14/12
PA-11-0172-O	07/17/12
DC-11-0338-O	07/17/12
PA-11-0240-O	07/25/12
DC-12-0275	07/30/12
DC-11-0072-O	08/14/12
IL-12-0145-O	09/20/12
MA-11-0315-HL-I	09/28/12

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Case File Number	Case Closing Date
DC-12-0341	11/01/12
DC-12-0284-O	12/19/12
IL-12-0095	01/09/13
PA-12-009-HL-I	01/15/13

Suggestions for Improvement/Best Practices

To strengthen the Amtrak Office of the Inspector General (OIG) Office of Investigations' investigative operations and internal safeguards and management procedures, we respectfully submit the following four suggestions and best practices for Amtrak OIG consideration. These suggestions and highlights have been discussed with you and members of your senior staff.

1. Ensure that Door Hinges are Affixed on the Interior Side of Evidence Storage Areas or Replace with Security Hinges.

In accordance with Amtrak OIG Investigations Manual, Chapter 13, Section 7, Authorized Storage Cabinets/Authorized Storage Areas, Subsection C, the Evidence Storage Area (ESA) access doors should be solid core wood construction or metal. Hinges on the access door should be affixed on the interior side of the room. If interior placement is not possible, the hinges should be the type from which the hinge pins cannot be removed or should be modified so the hinge pins cannot be removed. We observed that the ESA outer door has the hinges facing outward (exteriorly) which poses the risk of the hinge pins and ESA door being removed and granting unauthorized access to the ESA. During the quality assessment review, Amtrak OIG provided proof that a request has been made with facilities management to replace the ESA door hinges with security hinges or re-install hinges so that they are affixed interior to the facility.

2. Ensure that Accountable Law Enforcement Property Issued to Special Agents is Periodically Inventoried and Accounted for.

CIGIE Quality Standards for Investigations requires that OIGs conduct a periodic inventory of investigations-related accountable property such as badge and credentials, firearms, and specialized technical equipment.

We observed that Amtrak OIG has two separate databases (inventory list) used to account for its issued badges/credentials and other accountable property. The first list is designated as the "Master" inventory list and maintained by an investigative program analyst. The second is the "Administrative" inventory list and is maintained by an administrator. Also observed were instances when the two lists did not align concerning items issued to employees. This occurred, in part, because different individuals share responsibility for maintaining and accounting for badges/credentials and issued property respectively. The current inventory requires cross referencing the inventory lists generated from two different locations. One example of the disconnect with the inventory lists disclosed one agent had a badge in his possession that one of the list indicated was assigned to another agent who no longer worked at Amtrak OIG. This was

corrected on the spot and the proper annotations were made to the badge inventory lists. It is recommended that a central database be developed and maintained by one person who keeps track of all badges/credentials and other accountable property. If this is not feasible, recommend at minimum that the badge/credentials be maintained by one individual, and a second person maintain and be accountable for property.

3. Observations from Investigative Case Reviews.

The Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Quality Standards for Investigations, "Due Professional Care," states in part that, "organizations should establish written investigative policies and procedures via handbook, manual, directives, or similar mechanism."

In accordance with Amtrak OIG Investigations Manual, Chapter 4, Section 5, "Managing Investigations," Subsection C, states in part that "once the criminal aspects of a case have been completed and the remaining investigation is administrative, the case should be reviewed by the cognizant SAC every 30 days."

We observed that supervisory case reviews were conducted infrequently in cases opened prior to 2012. Likewise, there were some inconsistencies noted in case management prior to 2012.

- Six cases did not have the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI)
 notification letter in the case folder or in Amtrak Investigative Management
 System (AIMS.)
- Two FBI letter notifications occurred well past the 30 day requirement for notifying the FBI.
- Two administrative cases had FBI letters whereas some did not.
- Inconsistent completion of Investigative Plans in case files and AIMS
 prior to 2012. Albeit, cases opened and closed during the past 12 months
 had completed and detailed investigative plans.

Also observed were improvements in case management during 2012. Supervisory case reviews have been completed consistently. The quality, as well as investigative and administrative sufficiency also improved over this same time period. The implementation of investigative standards and creation of an investigative manual over the past year has improved the quality, documentation and management of investigations.

4. Best Practices and Laudatory Comments.

- Interviews of Amtrak OIG staff yielded laudatory comments about the outreach program initiated to educate and build relationships with the various Amtrak offices and employees throughout the corporation. OIG staff sees this as a force-multiplier for reciprocally sharing and receiving information required to perform its mission.
- OIG staff interviewed were very satisfied that management developed and implemented the investigations manual which has given clear direction and established internal standards for executing Amtrak OIG's investigative mission.
- The Computer Crime Unit agent is working cooperatively and collaboratively with the agency's Certified Information Systems Security Officer and has established a great relationship resulting in the reciprocal sharing of data and tools leveraged to rapidly standup this computer forensic capability at the Amtrak OIG.
- Overall, OIG staff were satisfied with the renewed focus and leadership of the Amtrak OIG. The office functions more efficiently and staff work more cohesively as a team. Staff stated that there is much more transparency in operations and administration of the office; morale has increased; and staff are committed to the success of the team and each member.